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ABSTRACT 
Government-sponsored patent assertion entities have materialized 
all over the world. This article looks at the market failure associated with 
the patent system. These entities have an opportunity to address these 
market inefficiencies. But, these entities can damage the innovation more 
by decreasing competition and increasing protectionism. This article looks 
at three such entities and argues that the US could use such an entity. 
  
 
1 Lecturer of Law, Economics & Regulations at Queen Mary University of London, Centre 
for Commercial Law Studies. The first draft of this article was written while visiting at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law and Ph.D. in Economics 
from Yale University. I would like to thank Nikolaus Thumm for our conversations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Some entities have come under fire because they have started to 
profitably enforce patents.2 Some scholars have argued that these entities 
constitute a deadweight loss on society: these entities impose costs on 
society (e.g., court costs3) without creating benefits (e.g., knowledge 
transfer or innovations4). 
These entities have also received the attention of policymakers. In 
the U.S., Congress passed the Leah-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).5 
The US Government Accountability Office’s study assessed the entities’ 
impact on litigation volume.6 The White House published its own report 
urging policymakers to temper the entities’ societal impact.7 Some states 
acted,8 but their actions were limited because patentability remains a 
federal question.9 These entities have drawn the interest of policymakers 
in Europe, as well.10 
 
2 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013). Here, the authors discuss some of the rhetoric behind patent trolls and 
their enforcement of patents. 
3 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387 (2014), In this piece, the authors estimate that non-practicing entities cost accrued $29 
billions of direct costs in 2011.  
4 Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 168–69 (2015) (finding that knowledge transfer—in the form of technical 
knowledge, personnel transfer, and joint venture creation—do not occur when patent assertion entities 
enforce patents). 
5 Leah-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat 284 (2011) (codified in 
sections of 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). The AIA changed the joinder rule in patent enforcement cases in 
order to hinder non-practicing entity suits, which had a tendency to join multiple defendants to the 
same suit in order to take advantage of economies of scale. Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: 
Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 673 (2012). 
6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE 
PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013) [hereinafter GAO Study]. “Congress, among others, ha[s] raised concerns 
that patent infringement litigation by NPEs is increasing . . . AIA mandates that GAO conduct a study 
on the consequences of patent litigation by NPEs.” Id. at 3–4. 
7 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, WHITE HOUSE 
(June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
8 E.g., Ryan DeSisto, Vermont vs. the Patent Troll: Is State Action a Bridge Too Far, 48 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 109, 123–129 (2015) (discussing the actions of Vermont policymakers in 
combatting patent assertion entities). 
9 Under the Patent Act, patentability remains the domain of Federal courts. 35 U.S.C. § 1 
(2000). Thus, state courts can be pre-empted to deal with these Federal issues. See, e.g., Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, Patent trolls and preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015). 
10 Europe Economics, Patent Assertion Entities in Europe: Their impact on innovation and 
knowledge transfer in ICT markets, JRC SCI. FOR POL’Y REP. (Thumm, Nikolaus & Garry Gabison 
eds., 2016); Dr. Luke McDonagh, Exploring Perspectives of the Unified Patent Court and Unitary 
Patent within the Business and Legal Communities, A REPORT COMMISSION BY THE UK 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 26–27 (2014) (investigating the potential impact of patent trolling 
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Entities enforcing patents cover a broad range of issues. Not all such 
entities and their enforcement behavior should be discouraged. The threat 
of enforcement is a necessary part of the patent system. 
The US created the Intellectual Property (IP) system to incentivize 
innovation.11 This system was important enough for the writers of the U.S. 
Constitution to have included it in their draft:12 the writers of the 
Constitution arguably intended to create a well-functioning right to 
exclude. Such functioning requires an enforcement system. Such 
enforcement system may require the involvement of a public enforcer. 
This paper focuses on government sponsored patent monetizing 
and asserting entities.13 Patent monetizing entities (PMEs) help patent 
holders license their patents to or enforce them against implementers.14 
PMEs are the agents of the patent holder.15 Patent assertion entities (PAEs) 
buy or license patents from inventors to license these patents to or enforce 
them against implementers.16 The distinction revolves around who retains 
control over the licensing or enforcement.17 
This paper argues that the IP system creates two inefficiencies: 
inefficient licensing and inefficient enforcement. Licensing and 
enforcement raise distinct challenges that a centralized government 
agency could resolve. 
This paper investigates PAEs and PMEs. Section I discusses the 
market failures of the patent system. First, patents can be difficult to match 
with technology implementers, leaving valuable patents unexploited. 
Second, patents are expensive to enforce, leading to imperfect 
enforcement and free-riding opportunities, as well as rent-seeking 
enforcement. Indirect governmental approaches offer the theoretical 
upsides that may never realize. Direct governmental involvement could 
enhance the patent system.  
Section II discusses the practical examples of such involvement. 
It discusses in more detail the business model of three governmental 
 
and arguing that the effects will be minimal in the UK); Marcel de Heide, Oana van der Togt, Noëlle 
Fischer, & Jos Winnink, Study on the changing role of Intellectual Property in the semiconductor 
industry – including non-practicing entities, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014). 
 
11 See generally GAO Study, supra note 6; Executive Office of the President, supra note 
7; Heide, van der Togt, Fischer, & Winnink, supra note 10. 
12 "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. 
art. I § 8. 
13 Other articles have referred to these entities as Sovereign Patent Funds; however, some 
of these funds are fully autonomous. E.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Sovereign Patent Funds, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1257 (2018). Section 4 discusses the difference in more detail. 
14 See GAO Study, supra note 6. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See Nguyen, supra note 13. 
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sponsored entities and their activities in the US. Scholars have heavily 
criticized these entities. First, the entities do not advance market 
transparency. Instead, their government sponsorship has limitations that 
force the entities to behave like private PAEs. Second, the entities’ links 
to governments open the door to nationalist and protectionist criticisms 
(and international sanctions).  
Section III argues that assuming that the IP system can incentivize 
innovation, these government sponsored entities can play an important 
role and the US government could implement such an entity. The USPTO 
could be the prime agency to carry out this role. It already has the patent 
expertise, which could be leverage. Beyond its economies of scope, such 
an agency could benefit the whole industry by encouraging and 
disseminating good practices in an industry often maligned.  
   
I. INEFFICIENT PATENT SYSTEM 
The public agencies enforce private rights on a regular basis.18 
Policymakers often create these public enforcers when the policymakers 
want to rectify a market failure.19  
US policymakers created the IP system to address such a market 
inefficiency with respect to knowledge.20 Knowledge is non-rival and non-
excludable. Because it is non-excludable, inventors cannot prevent others 
from implementing their creation. Because inventors cannot stop others 
from using their creation, they cannot harvest the benefit of their work. 
Because they cannot fully internalize the benefit of their work, they will 
undersupply knowledge. 
The IP system made knowledge excludable.21 Therefore, 
inventors could profit from their creation, incentivizing them to supply 
knowledge.22 However, by solving one inefficiency, policymakers created 
an IP system laden with other market failures.  
 
18 Garry A. Gabison, Public Enforcement of Private Rights, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 207 
(2017) 
19 See Nguyen, supra note 13. 
20 Id. 
21 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, infra note 22. 
22 The writer of the US constitution expressed the need to incentivize inventors. They 
wanted to "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries." U.S. 
CONST. art. I § 8. Some have questioned whether the patent system fixes these market inefficiencies 
and some have argued that alternative systems would be more efficient. See Michele Boldrin & David 
K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013) (arguing that a weaker patent 
system leads to more innovation when controlling for the competitive environment).  
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This section discusses two main issues: (1) the lack of knowledge 
transfer; and (2) the inefficient patent enforcement. Then, this section 
discusses what the government has attempted to do to address these 
inefficiencies. 
 
A. Failure to License IP 
This section discusses how the patent system fails to encourage 
innovation transfer because the demand and supply for the innovator’s 
knowledge fail to meet. This section assumes that the patent holder does 
not exploit his or her patent. Instead, she or he wants to monetize it. 
Knowledge transfer of patented innovation generally takes two 
forms: licensing and a sale. When a patent holder offers a license, she or 
he can offer two types of licenses: an exclusive license and a non-exclusive 
license.23 During a sale, she or he usually loses control over its exploitation 
method.24 In some cases, she or he restricts the patent before it sells (e.g. 
 
23 Exclusive license may take many forms. The patent holder may opt to grant an exclusive 
license instead of selling its patent because the license remains limited in scope, e.g. territory, use, 
time, etc. E.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (discussing the distinction between 
a license and an assignment where "[t]he patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, 
grant, and convey, either [1st,] the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend 
the invention throughout the United States; or [2nd,] an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; 
or [3rd,] the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United 
States."). 
24 Id.  
BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW    VOL. XII:I 
 
234 
Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory licensing terms,25 license before 
sell,26 etc.). Table 1 summarizes these methods of patent exploitations. 
 
 
 
 
  Control over the knowledge transfer 
  Control No Control 
Inventor's patent 
ownership 
Keep 
Non-exclusive 
license (i.e. 
directly imposed 
restrictions) 
Exclusive 
license 
Sell 
Patent sold with 
previous licensing 
commitment 
(servitude-type 
control) 
Unrestricted sell 
Table 1: Patent enforcement methods 
 
 
25 Intellectual property rights have been compared to real property: a bundle of rights. 
Courts have recognized intellectual property rights as a bundle of rights. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (stating that “[a]n author holds a bundle of exclusive rights in the copyrighted 
work, among them the right to copy and the right to incorporate the work into derivative works.”); K 
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1988) (stating that “[t]rademark law, like contract 
law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a 
bundle of such rights, one of which is the right to . . . bar foreign-made goods bearing that trademark.”); 
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating 
that “[a] patent provides its owner with the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the 
claimed invention. It is, in effect, a bundle of rights which may be divided and assigned, or retained 
in whole or part.”) (internal quotation omitted). The inventor can sell the whole bundle or sell only 
some rights. Id. In practice, inventors can create binding agreements that run with the patent from its 
inception – much like a servitude. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND 
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2 UTAH L. REV. 479, 536–38 (2015) (discussing the debate 
over the treatment of FRAND like a real property servitude). For example, an inventor can participate 
to a standard, declare his patent a standard essential patent (SEP), and commit to license this patent on 
fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Id. These obligations (or limitations on 
enforcement) run with the patent. Id. "If a patentee can undo the FRAND commitment merely by 
selling its patents to someone who has not personally made that commitment, that comfort is illusory." 
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135, 1158 (2013). Thus, the court can use estoppel 
principles to ensure that if the original inventor committed to certain terms, he cannot circumvent these 
commitments by selling its patents. Id. at 1158–60. 
26 Defensive patent aggregators offer services where they purchase patents and offer 
licenses to their subscribers; to avoid that non-subscribers free-ride on their services, after granting a 
license to their subscriber, they resell the patent and non-subscribers are still faced with potential 
liability issues. See, e.g., Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, 
Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 58 (2013). This business 
method has been referred as "catch-and-release." Id. 
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Patent holders often fail to license or sell their patents. One study 
found that a minority of companies licenses out their patents, but 
companies often wish to license more.27 Most companies cite identifying 
licensing partners as the most important problem.28 Surveyed patent 
holders more frequently cite matching with partners than issues 
surrounding licensing fees, negotiation costs, and technology advances.29 
Right holders and right exploiters have difficulty finding each other due to 
transaction costs (e.g., search cost, identifying the IP holder, etc.). Because 
of these transaction costs, individuals under-utilize these inventions.30 
Under-utilization leads to under-compensated inventors. The under-
compensation disincentivizes inventors, which was the original market 
failure that the IP system sought to address. 
 
B. Imperfect Enforcement of IP 
This section focuses on the imperfect exclusory right. Patent 
holders can collect licensing fees because they have the right to stop others 
from using this knowledge. Without the right to exclude, the patent system 
fails because patents become worthless: (1) knowledge implementers free 
ride on the works of the knowledge creator; (2) inventors become less 
incentivized to innovate or inventors do not file a patent and rely on trade 
secrets;31 (3) either way, knowledge does not transfer. 
This exclusory right is not self-enforceable. The patent holder 
must actively enforce these rights through the courts and administrative 
system.32 Much like licensing, assertion differs along two dimensions: (1) 
who owns the intellectual property;33 and (2) who controls the enforcement 
methods. Table 2 models these assertion methods. 
 
 
27 Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Dominique Guellec, Who Licenses out Patents and Why?: 
Lessons from a Business Survey, OECD SCI., TECH. & INDUSTRY WORKING PAPERS (2009). "27% of 
Japanese companies declared to license patents to non-affiliated partners while the corresponding 
figure for European is 20%." Id. at 12. Forty-five percent of European companies and 80% of Japanese 
companies that already license want to license more. Id. at Table 11 & 12.  
28 See also Table 13. 
29 Id. 
30 The Coase theorem suggests that regardless of the initial allocation, a right will end up 
with the highest valuator if the initial right holder and the highest valuator can negotiate without 
transaction costs. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
31 Petra Moser, Innovation without Patents: Evidence from World’s Fairs, 55 J. L. & ECON. 
43 (2012) (showing that inventors have a tendency to patent more once reverse engineering becomes 
easier). 
32 For example, the US International Trade Commission can investigate alleged patent 
infringement by imported goods pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337 and the Administrative Procedure Act. 
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). These investigations are referred as § 337 investigations. Id. 
33 While this paper focuses on the patents, entities that collect fees for their services can 
enforce copyrights. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 1105 (2015) (discussing PAEs in the copyright domain). 
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  Control over the assertion methods 
  Control No Control 
Inventor's patent 
ownership 
Keep Self-assertion (self-finance) 
Delegated 
assertion (e.g., 
PME) 
Sell 
Limited 
Control 
(possible 
servitude) 
Third party 
assertion  
(e.g., PAE) 
Table 2: Patent enforcement methods 
 
The nuances of control and ownership may however live along a 
continuum.34 Ownership determines who benefits from enforcement. The 
inventor benefits if he keeps the patent; otherwise the assignee benefits.35 
Control determines who directs the proceedings.36 The table depicts four 
cases. 
PAEs buy patents and assert them to profit.37 In some cases, PAEs 
acquire patent encumbered with Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
obligations.38 With PMEs, the patent holder keeps ownership but may lose 
control of the litigation.39 Beside control, the inventor may prefer selling 
because it guarantees revenues whereas keeping the patent leaves the 
inventor relying on an uncertain assertion strategy.40 
Depending on the quadrant, the inventor carries different portions of the 
enforcement costs. Since patent enforcement is costly, it cannot be 
complete.41 
A patent holder may not enforce a valid patent claim because the 
enforcement costs outweigh the benefits. In 2013, the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association reported that the median patent suit 
costs about: $700,000 if less than $1 million is at risk; $2 million if $1 to 
$10 million is at risk; $3.3 million if $10 to $25 million is at risk; and $5.5 
 
34 An FTC study found that “[u]nder some agreements, patent sellers agreed to assist with 
litigation, such as by making inventors available to testify, while in other agreements, the patent sellers 
retained authority to control certain aspects of the litigation or licensing activity.” Federal Trade 
Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: an FTC Study, FTC, 49 (2016) [hereinafter FTC Study]. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Beside litigation costs, patent holders incur other costs (e.g., infringement detection), 
which make enforcement also less likely. Id. 
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million if more than $25 million is at risk.42 For the low and medium value 
claims, the median costs can outweigh the benefits. 
To address this problem, patent holders can exploit economies of 
scale. Low value claims may be privately inefficient, but a patent holder 
could join multiple alleged infringers and/or infringements to save costs. 
However, this joinder tactic has been associated with rent seeking 
strategies43 so much so that the U.S. Congress modified the joinder rule to 
stop these types of suits.44 This new joinder rule limits how a plaintiff joins 
alleged patent infringers:45 it limits joinder to infringements arising out of 
the same facts instead of the same patent.46 This new joinder has affected 
rent seeking behaviors but it also has affected patent holders, who would 
want to enforce low value claims against numerous infringers.47 
Beside enforcement costs, patent holders’ budget constraints may 
limit enforcement. A holder with budget constraints may not be able to 
upfront the litigation costs.48 If a holder wants to circumvent its budget 
constraint, then she or he may opt to use a contingency fee agreement.  
For such agreement to be privately efficient for attorneys, they would need 
to demand high contingency rates. For example, a low value claim of $1 
million may cost $700,000 to enforce. It would be privately efficient for 
the patent holder to enforce this claim because he or she would stand to 
make $300,000. However, if the holder cannot upfront the $700,000, then 
 
42 All cost information describes the costs to pursue to a case to its conclusion. David A. 
Divine & Richard W. Goldstein, Report of Economic Survey 2013, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 
(2013). 
43 See GAO Study, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
44 § 1, 125 Stat.  
45 The AIA limits the joinder rule in order to address non-practicing entity suits. Bryant, 
supra note 5, at 673.  
46 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2013). 
47 The FTC has pointed out this problem during its Section 6(b) investigation. FTC Study, 
supra note 34, at 22–23. 
48 "[P]atent enforcement has become financially undoable for small startup companies. 
NPEs provide an avenue to protect assets that would otherwise be lost due to financial constraints." 
Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, SANTA CLARA 
L. DIG. COMMONS, 3, 18 (2013). In countries like Germany, plaintiff must post a bond to enforce an 
injunction. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 
injunction bonds in the German system and stating that “[t]he German injunction is not self-enforcing. 
According to an expert declaration on German law submitted by Motorola to the district court, to 
enforce the German patent injunction, [the plaintiff] would have to post a security bond covering 
potential damages to [the defendant] should the infringement ruling be reversed on appeal."). The 
German injunctive relief requires that plaintiff post a bond. Id. This bond is proportionate to the harm 
the injunction would cause if the defendant could reverse the decision on appeal. Id. Thus, if an SME 
request an injunction against a large producing entity, it may not be able to post the bond. Id. Without 
an injunction, the defendant could decide to stall the negotiations and keep infringing. Id. These bonds 
can be substantial. Id. at 880. Injunction bonds aggravate the patent enforcement budget constraint 
discussed previously. See generally Pierre Véron & Olivier Mandel, 20 Years of Preliminary 
Injunction in French Patent Infringement Litigation, VÉRON & ASSOCIÉS (2004). They also affect 
available enforcement strategies and settlement likelihood. Id. Government sponsored PMEs like 
France Brevets allow patent holder to post the required injunction bonds. Id. 
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the attorney would need a 70% contingency fee to justify taking on the 
case. With an uncertain outcome, enforcement becomes less likely.49 
 Infringers may take advantage of these failures to willingly free 
ride. In return, enforcement ease affects the ex-ante incentive to innovate. 
 
C. Governmental Efforts to Address Licensing & Enforcement 
Failures 
 
For the most part, governmental efforts to address these market 
failures. This section discusses these efforts and their shortcomings. 
 First, some governments have attempted to address the pre-
commercial licensing costs indirectly. Pre-commercial knowledge transfer 
and license often fail.50 Licensing market failure occurs when: (1) 
practitioners want to license-in technological knowledge; (2) patent 
holders want to license-out their technology,51 but (3) practitioners and 
patent holders cannot match or come to an agreement.52  
A well-functioning licensing system benefits society as a whole 
because it avoids repeating research or costly work-around. In fact, some 
innovation participants favor licensing.53 Policymakers have attempted to 
incentivize indirectly these innovation participants. 
 
49 A patent holder does not know how a judge or (jury) will decide a case ex-ante. Even 
strong cases can be dismissed for procedural reasons. Weighing its certain litigation costs against the 
expected benefits may make the suit privately inefficient or mean that attorneys request even higher 
contingency fee. See FTC Study, supra note 34, at 48–49. 
50 These kind of licenses have been referred to as carrot licenses. "Carrot licensing is an 
active and defensive approach and the original patent owner searches for potential licensees interested 
in the technology. The potential licensee does not use the patent before the licensing contract is 
concluded." Frauke Rüther, PATENT AGGREGATING COMPANIES, Springer 32 (2013)(internal 
quotation omitted). 
51 Some in the past have argued that patents should follow the path of copyright, and 
compulsory licenses should be created. See e.g. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the 
United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 666 (1988). The argument in 
this section assumes that patent holders wish to license out. 
52 Various transaction costs hinder these matching, collaboration, and licensing activities. 
Transaction costs include searching for a partner, contract drafting, etc. Zuniga, supra note 28, at 18. 
Table 13 shows that difficulties in finding partners is the most cited factor of an important obstacle to 
licensing. 
53 Some patent holders prefer licensing-out their technology instead of practicing it. See 
e.g. Alfonso Gambardella, Paola Giuri, & Alessandra Luzzi, The market for patents in Europe, 36 
RESEARCH POLICY 1163 (2007)(finding that company size of the patent holders predicts their 
willingness to license their patent out). Some practitioners have limited competences and resources to 
devote to research. See e.g., Keld Laursen, Maria Isabella Leone, & Salvatore Torrisi, Technological 
Exploration Through Licensing: New Insights From the Licensee’s Point of View, INDUSTRIAL AND 
CORPORATE CHANGE, Table 1 & 3 (2010) (showing that companies that license-in are, on average, 
smaller, and finding that size affects how far from existing technology a company is willing to 
explore). 
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For example, US policymakers have passed legislation like the 
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 198054 to facilitate the 
licensing and exploitation of underutilized university patents.55 It 
decreases the transaction costs associated with technology licensing for 
universities. Thus, the act narrowly focuses and indirectly encourages the 
licensing of university patents. 
 Other policymakers have attempted to encourage pre-
commercialization licensing through indirect financial incentives. For 
instance, patent boxes56 are lower tax rates or tax credits for royalty 
income.57 These boxes provide a marginal benefit to innovators to exploit 
their patents through licenses (or to sell).58 As such, they provide a 
marginal to sell and license unutilized patents.59  
 
54 Pub. L. 96–517 (1980). Also known as the Bayh-Dole Act. 
55 Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh–Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 95 
(2004)(discussing the history of the Bayh-Dole act). 
56 Patent boxes get their name from the box a taxpayer needs to tick to assert incomes from 
IP exploitation. Robert D. Atkinson & Scott Andes, Patent Boxes: Innovation in Tax Policy and Tax 
Policy for Innovation (Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2011, at 7–8, 
available at http://www.itif.org/files/201 l-patent-box-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
57 Patent boxes, or innovation boxes, can encompass more than royalties. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, they can encompass all intellectual property related income and may not even require 
invention patenting. These must not be confused with R&D tax incentives, which come at the R&D 
stage, whereas patent box tax benefits come at the exploitation stage. See e.g. Michael J. Graetz & 
Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of 
International Income Taxation, 113 COLUMBIA L. REV. 347, 362–75 (2013). 
58 The box requirements vary greatly from country to country. Some countries allow for 
the tax benefits to be claimed by inventors who exploit their own patents (embedded licenses), while 
other tax regimes limt the tax benefit to pure licensing revenues. See e.g. PwC, Global Research & 
Development Incentives Group, (2015) https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/assets/pwc-global-r-and-d-
brochure-may-2015.pdf; PwC, Patent Box and Technology Incentives: Tax and Financial Reporting 
Considerations, (2015) https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-accounting-services/assets/pwc-patent-box-
and-technology-incentives-tax-and-reporting-considerations.pdf; Qantria Strategies, Patent Boxes, 
Technological Innovation and Implications for Corporate Tax Reform, (2015) Retrieved from 
American Action Forum: http://americanactionforum.org/research/patent-boxes-technological-
innovation-and-implications-for-corporate (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
59 The history of patent boxes show that they have been implemented for indirect 
protectionist reasons. These patent boxes first appeared in Europe. Ireland passed its first patent box 
in 1973. The year coincided with Ireland assenting into the European Union. To claim the patent box 
regime, the R&D behind the patent had to be performed in Ireland. The European Commission asserted 
this same argument when it opposed the Irish patent box. In 2007, the European Commission 
"requested Ireland to change its tax law provision by which patent royalties are tax exempt only if 
research leading to the patent was carried out in Ireland" because the Irish nexus approach "is 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services." European 
Commission, Direct Taxation: Commission Requests Ireland to End Discriminatory Rules on Tax 
Treatment of Patent Royalties, (Mar. 23, 2007) Retrieved from European Commission: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-408_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). So, the 
Irish patent box was arguably implemented to incentivize R&D centers not to move to other European 
Member States. Patent boxes have been heavily criticized as a form of tax competition. Ireland 
implemented in 1973 and eliminated its patent boxes in 2010. After France in 2000, the patent box 
proliferation sped up among European Member States. In the next decade, five Member States passed 
comparable legislation – namely Hungary (2003), Belgium (2007), the Netherlands (2007), Spain 
(2008), and Luxembourg (2008). Since then, Malta (2010), Cyprus (2012), the UK (2013), and 
Portugal (2014) also enacted a patent box tax law. See Qantria Strategies, supra note 58.  
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 The impact on knowledge transfer remains unclear: the countries 
implementing these boxes have not benefited through tax revenues60 and 
their impact on patenting and patent-licensing/sales has not been 
measured.61 
Second, some governments have attempted to address the 
enforcement costs by including attorney's fees recovery as a remedy. In 
some US jurisdictions and the EU system,62 IP holders can already recover 
attorney's fees in case of success. However, in other legal areas, adding 
attorney’s fees have not corrected the suboptimal enforcement. For 
example, in employment discrimination cases, recovery of attorney's fees 
failed to incentivize plaintiffs to optimally enforce their rights.63 
Indirect efforts to encourage pre-commercialization licensing and post-
commercialization enforcement, have left room for improvement. Some 
governments have taken more direct actions. 
First, some governments are already targeting pre-
commercialization market failures. For example, the Korean government 
created the Korean Integrated Contract Manufacturing Service. This 
government initiative helps small and medium (SME) enterprises "diffuse 
their innovative technologies."64 This initiative has helped many SMEs 
defeat (pre-commercialization) matching failures.  
 
60 For the implementing countries, the impact on tax revenues has been on average 
negative. A patent box regime has two effects on its IP income tax revenues: (1) IP income tax 
revenues decrease because companies already paying IP income taxes in the implementing country 
are now paying a lower tax rate; (2) IP income tax revenues increase because companies that were not 
paying IP income taxes in this country may be willing to relocate their IP management to take 
advantage of the lower rates. Counterfactual studies have attempted to test these effects. They used a 
discrete choice model to determine how each company decides where to locate their IP management. 
They found that companies respond to IP tax regime changes and they relocate where their IP was 
held. Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller, & Martin O'Connell, Ownership of Intellectual Property and 
Corporate Taxation, 111 J. PUBLIC ECON. 12 (2014). Another study found similar impact on patenting 
location. See also, Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria 
Skonieczna, & Antonio Vezzani, Patent Boxes Design, Patents, Location and Local R&D, European 
Commission (2015) https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC96080_Patent_boxes.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
61 The Griffith et al. study and the Alstadsæter et al. study both assume that the patenting 
behavior is unaffected by these patent boxes. Id. They instead test where patenting occurs assuming 
that patent will occur in one of the jurisdictions of choice. A counterfactual addressing the overall 
impact on patenting has not been performed. 
 
62 See e.g., Garry A. Gabison, Lessons that Europe can Learn From the US Patent 
Assertion Entity Phenomenon, 24 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 278, 289–92 (2015). 
63 Gabison, supra note 18. 
64 Sungjoo Lee, Gwangman Park, Byungun Yoon, & Jinwoo Park, Open Innovation in 
SMEs – An Intermediated Network Model, 39 RESEARCH POLICY 290, 296–99 (2010). 
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The Korean government also founded a PME, Intellectual 
Discovery, in 2010.65 In 2012, it acquired a portfolio of 244 patents from 
Avago Technology, a Singapore based chipmaker.66 Later that year, 
Intellectual Discovery sold to Google a patent entitled "Personal viewing 
device with system for providing identification information to a connected 
system."67 This patent was later incorporated into the Google Glasses 
commercialized in 2013.68 This transfer exemplifies successful pre-
commercialization transfers where government sponsored PMEs played 
an active role. In this case, Intellectual Discovery just flipped the patents 
more than they acted as a broker between Avago and Google; nonetheless, 
they made the deal possible. Other public centralized entities can play that 
role. 
These centralized entities are common in copyright in both the US 
private and public sector. For example, in the U.S. sound recording 
industry, three private entities act as centralized bargaining agent and offer 
blanket licenses.69 They collect the fees on behalf of songwriters, 
composers, and music publishers. They later distribute these fees in the 
form of royalties to their members according to performance frequency.70  
In the public sector, the U.S. policymakers have assigned the U.S. 
Copyright Office to act as the central entity. U.S. policymakers have 
created statutory compulsory licenses.71 These compulsory licenses72 
 
65 Company>History, INTELLECTUAL DISCOVERY, http://www.i-
discovery.com/site/kr/overview/history.jsp (last visited Jan. 2019). 
66 Dan Levine and Miyoung Kim, Insight: Nation-states Enter Contentious Patent-buying 
Business, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2013) http://in.reuters.com/article/us-patents-nations-insight-
idUSBRE92J07B20130320 (last visited July 29, 2016). 
67 US Patent 6,735,328 filed on March 7, 2000 and granted on May 11, 2004. The patent 
filing shows that the original assignee was Agilent Technologies, Inc. (Palo Alto, CA). Avago 
Technologies was bought in 2000 and then divested by Agilent Technologies in 2006. Jeffrey 
McCracken, Alex Sherman & Ian King, Avago to Buy Broadcom for $37 Billion in Biggest Tech Deal 
Ever, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/avago-
said-near-deal-to-buy-wireless-chipmaker-broadcom (last visited July 29, 2016). Through the sale, 
Avago Technologies kept some of the patents, which were later sold to Intellectual Discovery. The 
USPTO record shows that US Patent 6,735,328 has been transferred to Google, Inc. on November 16, 
2012. 
68 Bill Slawski, Google Acquires Patent For Eye Scan Security And Augmented Imagery, 
SEO BY THE SEA (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.seobythesea.com/2013/01/eye-scan-security-
augmented-imagery/. 
69 These three entities are Broadcast Music Incorporated, American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers, and SESAC, which stands for Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers. 
70 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 US 1 (1979) 
(discussing the sound recording industry business model).  
71 17 U.S. Code § 115. 
72 Compulsory license seekers must file a notice with the Copyright Office. The Copyright 
Office then collects compulsory license royalties for copyright holders. Later, it later redistributes 
these fees to right holders. See e.g. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Librarian of Congress, 146 F.3d 
907, 912–13 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing the functioning of compulsory licensing collection and 
distribution). 
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avoid the matching73 issue and holdup problem associated with licensing 
negotiations.74  
This system has been criticized as inefficient. First, compulsory 
licensing rates create market ceiling.75 This ceiling incentivizes 
individuals seeking compulsory licenses to negotiate longer:76 the 
statutory licensing fee acts as a holdout mechanism. Second, the 
compulsory licensing system can be slow and resource intensive.77  
In copyright context, these private right aggregators provide an 
example of a well-functioning system that enable licensing. In spite of the 
criticisms, the government agency serves as complement to their efforts. 
Comparable centralized entities are rarer in the patent context. For 
example, patent pools aggregate patents and license the pooled portfolio 
to willing practitioners. These patents are usually technology-related or 
complementary.78 This idiosyncrasy limits their proliferation to 
complementary technologies.79  
Second, some governments has also taken direct actions with 
respect to post-commercialization infringement. For example, the French 
government created a PME, France Brevets, in 2010.80 France Brevets 
 
73 This system addresses matching failure. When the copyright holder cannot be ascertained 
(i.e. orphan works), the Copyright Office collects the fees on behalf of the unknown rightful owner. 
See e.g. Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: a Compulsory Licensing Solution to the 
Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 35 (2014) (discussing the benefits of having 
compulsory licenses for orphan works). 
74 Because copyrighted works are not homogenous, some parties have larger bargaining 
powers. The asymmetric bargaining power can lead to socially efficient deals to fail. 
 
75 See e.g. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 215 (2009). 
76 See e.g. Karen Hsieh, Unlock the Music: Replacing Compulsory Music Licenses with 
Free Market Negotiation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595 (2015). 
77 See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace: A Report of the 
Register of Copyrights, 107 (Feb. 2015) http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-
and-the-music-marketplace.pdf (discussing the concerns expressed by respondent to a public 
consultation). 
78 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY & ECON., 119, 127–28 (2001). 
79 Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent Pool 
Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INTERNATIONAL J. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 294 
(2011)(discussing some of the dynamics behind patent holders' willingness to participate in a patent 
pool). These pools benefit practitioners as well as patent holders. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs 
Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 473, 495 (2005). 
80 In 2010, the French government created its PME, France Brevets. "Constituée en mars 
2010 sous la forme d’une société par actions simplifiée, France Brevets est dotée d’un capital de 100 
M€ à terme, à parité entre la Caisse des dépôts agissant pour le compte de l’Etat dans le cadre du 
Programme d’Investissements d’Avenir et la Caisse des Dépôts intervenant pour son compte propre" 
which translates to: Established in March 2010 as a joint stock company, France Brevets has a capital 
of €100 million which were invested in equal shares by la Caisse des dépôts on behalf of the State as 
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sued HTC in the U.S.81 The government sponsored PME directly enforced 
the rights of its clients. 
 In other context (e.g., employment or housing discrimination), 
U.S. policymakers have directly intervened when rights were under-
enforced.82 Policymakers filled the enforcement gap by creating a public 
enforcement agency. The same could be done with patent enforcement in 
the US. The next section discusses in more detail the actions of 
government-backed PMEs. 
 
II. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PMES 
This section discusses three government sponsored PMEs: South 
Korea's Intellectual Discovery; Japan’s IP Bridge; and France’s France 
Brevets. 
A. Intellectual Discovery 
Intellectual Discovery was created in 2010 “to evaluate and 
invests in IP owned by entities and to provide the entities with direct or 
indirect benefits.”83 Intellectual Discovery has been involved in the most 
transactions of the three.84 Searching its US patent portfolio shows that 
Intellectual Discovery registered three hundred and twenty-three unique 
transactions as the assignee of patent transactions and 16 as the assignor 
of patents.85  
The three hundred and twenty-three patent transactions are 
divided into three types of transaction: exclusive licenses, licensing 
agreements, and patent assignments. Intellectual Discovery registered two 
hundred and twenty-two exclusive licensing agreements, ninety-two 
licensing agreements, and one thousand one hundred and ninety-one 
patent assignments. Table 3 shows the distribution of agreements where 
 
part of the Program on Investments for the Future and la Caisse des dépôts acting for its own account. 
(author's translation) http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/france-brevets-0 (last visited Jul. 23 2016). 
81 NFC Technology, LLC v. HTC America, et al., 2:13-CV-01058-JRG (ED Tex. 2013). 
"NFC Technology, LLC ("NFCT"), a Delaware limited liability corporation with its principal place of 
business in Marshall, Texas. NFCT is a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of France Brevets" NXP 
Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. France Brevets, SAS, No. C 14-1225 SI (ND Cal. 2014). 
82 Gabison, supra note 18. 
83 http://www.i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/aboutid.jsp (last visited Sep. 20, 2018). 
See also, Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1266-67 for more details. 
84 Jack Ellis, Intellectual Discovery May be the Biggest of the Sovereign Patent Funds, but 
its Activities are the Least Known, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (May 27, 2016), http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=c13bfd7c-9f0b-4496-80c7-913518233bd1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
85 All pertinent information was extracted from http://assignment.uspto.gov/ on July 31, 
2016. 
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Intellectual Discovery was the assignee.86 The country is based on the 
origin of the assignor. 
 
Table 3: Patent transactions with Intellectual Discovery as patent 
assignee 
Country of assignor 
(major contributor) 
Exclusive licensing 
agreement 
Licensing 
agreement 
Patent assignment 
South Korea 211 95% 92 100% 810 68% 
(SK Hynix Inc.) (0) (0%) (0) (0%) (104) (9%) 
(Samsung) (0) (0%) (0) (0%) (99) (8%) 
(Elec. & Telecom. 
Research Inst.) 
(166) (75%) (79) (86%) (86) (7%) 
United States 11 5% 0 0% 217 18% 
(IBM) (0) (0%) (0) (0%) (143) (12%) 
All Other 0 0% 0 0% 164 14% 
(Avago, Singapore) (0) (0%) (0) (0%) (135) (11%) 
Total 222 100% 92 100% 1191 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
source: USPTO 
 
This data shows that Intellectual Discovery favored assignments 
over licensing agreements: 79% of transactions are assignments, 15% are 
exclusive licenses, and 6% are licenses. So, Intellectual Discovery acts 
more like a PAE in the United States (acquiring patents) than a PME 
(licensing patents). 
Intellectual Discovery agreed with entities from South Korea, the 
United States, Singapore, Canada, and Japan. Its network could explain 
the predominance of agreements with South Korean patent holders. Since 
it is a Korean based entity, it has a comparative advantage in contacting 
Korea-based patent holders.  
The origin of the patent provides an interesting look into its 
business model. First, most contributions come either from large research 
institutes or individuals associated with universities and research centers. 
Intellectual Discovery registered three hundred and thirty-one patents 
transferred from Electronics & Telecommunications Research Institute: 
 
86 Note that patent assignments can be registered under 35 U.S. Code § 261. Any failure to 
register transaction does not terminate or forfeit the transaction. Instead, it protects against subsequent 
claims acting like a race statute. Therefore, every assignment to and by Intellectual Discovery may not 
be recorded. In general, PAEs seem to register their patents. The FTC study found that about 95.5% 
of acquired patents are recorded with the USPTO and about 66.9% are recorded within 90 days of 
acquisition date. FTC Study, supra note 34, 144–46. Therefore, looking at the USPTO records can 
provide valuable information about PAE activities. 
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eighty-six were assignments, one hundred and sixty-six were exclusive 
licenses, and seventy-nine were licenses.87 Gwangju Institute of Science 
and Technology assigned twenty-four patents to Intellectual Discovery.88 
Over eighty patents were assigned from different research centers and 
industry-academy cooperation groups. Beside these large assignments, 
about 15% of patents came from individual inventors with ties to research 
centers and universities.  
Universities and research centers play an important role in their 
business model. About a third of the patents assigned to Intellectual 
Discovery come from universities and research institutes. About 87% of 
the exclusive licenses come from research institutes, which include eleven 
patents licensed by Arizona State University. All the license agreements 
come from South Korean universities and research institutes. 
Second, contributions from the private sector usually come from 
large practicing companies. From South Korea, Intellectual Discovery was 
assigned one hundred and four patents from SK Hynix89 and ninety-nine 
patents from Samsung.90 In the US, it was assigned one hundred and forty-
three patents from IBM.91 From Singapore, it was assigned one hundred 
and thirty-five patents from Avago.92 These assigning companies may not 
exploit the patents because they fall outside their practicing areas. Instead, 
they decided to monetize them through Intellectual Discovery. 
 As an assignor, Intellectual Discovery only conducted 
assignments of rights. It conducted 16 transactions involving fifty-four 
patents: six transactions involved Korean companies and twenty-six 
patents; four transactions involved US companies and twenty-two patents; 
and six involved Hong Kong companies and six patents ( 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4).93 
 
87 Reel Frames 30418-587, 32242-407, 29589-357, 32456-991, 29343-203, 31171-898, 
30831-249, 31615-770, 30695-272, 34594-283, 34594-229, 34594-461, 34077-862, 34594-15, 34594-
115, 29343-196 completed in 2012, 2013, and 2014. 
88 Reel Frames 26198-918, 35218-758, 37285-602, 33630-12, 37285-618, 35357-835, 
38316-94, 39193-105 completed from 2011 to 2016. 
89 Reel Frames 32421-488 and 30471-480 completed in 2013 and 2014. 
90 Reel Frames 34151-504, 29776-256, 29776-78, 29776-178, 29775-973, 29761-694, and 
29776-463 completed in 2013 and 2014. 
91 Reel Frames 30596-562, 30624-719, 32007-568, 30628-554, and 34849-203 completed 
in 2013 and 2014. 
92 Reel Frames 28972-733, 28968-296, and 28995-175 completed in 2012. 
93 All the HK transactions were with Golden Valley Holdings. Reel Frames 38738-707, 
38739-42, 38738-769, 38738-553, 38739-180, and 38738-881 completed in 2016. 
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Table 4: Patent assignments with Intellectual Discovery as patent 
assignor 
Country of assignee 
(major contributor) 
South Korea 26 48% 
(Hyundai Motor 
Comp.) 
(18) (33%) 
(Neolab 
Convergence Inc.) 
(6) (11%) 
United States 22 41% 
(XCSR, LLC) (9) (17%) 
(Game and Tech. 
Co.) 
(8) (15%) 
(CTSI Co.) (4) (7%) 
Hong Kong 6 11% 
(Golden Valley 
Holdings) 
(6) (11%) 
Total 54 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
source: USPTO 
 
These transactions show that Intellectual Discovery does not 
license (or at least has not registered its licensing agreements). Thus, it 
confirms that it behaves more like a PAE than a licensing PME as an 
assignor as well.  
These transactions also illustrate that Intellectual Discovery 
acquires and assigns patents to non-Korea entities. Some questions were 
raised about some of its transactions.94 Since 2016, Intellectual Discovery 
 
 
94 Jack Ellis, Patents linked to South Korea’s Intellectual Discovery asserted in Eastern 
Texas litigation, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Oct. 26, 2015) (discussing the suits filed by Game and 
Technology against Blizzard Entertainment, Riot Games, Valve and Wargamingnet involving patents 
that were assigned to Game and Technology by Intellectual Discovery) http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e5c2b3e8-3c40-4d9d-836d-6becd30ff516 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
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has divested part of its portfolio.95 This came after the former CEO 
complained about budget cuts.96  
 
B. IP Bridge 
IP Bridge is a Japanese government sponsored PME founded in 
2013.97 It hopes to prevent free riding.98 It received funds from public and 
private entities.99 It aims to serve SMEs and startups, universities and 
research centers, as well as large companies.100  
IP Bridge has a comparable portfolio to Intellectual Discovery. Its 
behavior, nonetheless, seems more focused on Japanese held patents. In 
the US, IP Bridge was involved in thirty-six unique transactions as an 
assignee with entities from Japan and one entity from the United States 
(Table 5).101 These thirty-six transactions involved one thousand two 
hundred and twenty six patents, of which nine hundred and fifty were 
assigned by Panasonic,102 one hundred by NEC,103 and eighty-eight by 
Sanyo.104 Contrary to Intellectual Discovery, IP Bridge has not registered 
any licensing agreements. 
 
Table 5: Patent transactions with IP Bridge  
Country of assignor 
& assignee 
(major contributor) 
IP Bridge Assignee IP Bridge Assignor 
Japan 1184 97% 38 100% 
(Panasonic) (950) (77%) (21) (55%) 
(NEC) (100) (8%) (0) (0%) 
(Sanyo Elec.) (88) (7%) (17) (45%) 
 
95 Jacob Schindler, Intellectual Discovery offloads another portfolio and narrows business 
focus in new CEO’s first year, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Dec. 18, 2017). https://www.iam-
media.com/litigation/intellectual-discovery-offloads-another-portfolio-and-narrows-business-focus-
new (last visited Sep. 20, 2018). 
96 Jacob Schindler, More upheaval in the SPF sector as Intellectual Discovery CEO 
resigns, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Oct. 27, 2016). https://www.iam-media.com/litigation/more-
upheaval-spf-sector-intellectual-discovery-ceo-resigns (last visited Sep. 20, 2018). 
97 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1263–66 for more details. 
98 Id. 
99 Bruce Einhorn, Asia Is Getting Its Own Patent Police, BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2016) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-08/xiaomi-huawei-and-others-seek-tech-patent-
infringement-fees; http://ipbridge.co.jp/en/about (last visited July 29, 2016). 
100 IP BRIDGE, http://ipbridge.co.jp/eng/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
101 IP Bridge was assigned 42 patents from Visteon Global Technologies in in 2015 (Reel 
Frame 35421-739). 
102 Reel Frames 35968-223, 35510-59, 35509-804, 35003-660, 33161-573, 32268-568, 
32205-550, 32204-693, 32197-273, 32054-628, 32028-105, 32094-311, 31954-554, 31953-882, 
31953-393, 31950-683, 31903-183, 32152-514, 32209-63, 36054-104, 36036-705, 35695-16, 35510-
335, and 35003-750 completed between 2013 and 2015. 
103 Reel Frame 34834-806 completed in 2014. 
104 Reel Frames 32077-337, 32153-515, 31736-80, 31736-69, 31771-485, and 31771-436. 
BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW    VOL. XII:I 
 
248 
United States 42 3% 0 0% 
(Visteon Global 
Tech. Inc.) 
(42) (3%) (0) (0%) 
Total 1226 100% 38 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
source: USPTO 
 
IP Bridge was involved in two unique transactions as an assignor 
with entities from Japan (i.e. Panasonic and Sanyo). These assignments 
involved thirty-eight patents. 
IP Bridge was more open about its litigation strategy.105 It brought 
suits in the US against TCL Corporation, a Chinese electronic 
manufacturer,106 Broadcom Limited,107 Intel,108 two American 
semiconductor manufacturers, and Omnivision Technologies, an 
American electronic developer.109 IP Bridge continues to litigate its 
patents. It recorded some successes.110 
 
C. France Brevets 
France Brevets has the smallest portfolio of these three entities. 
France Brevets aimed “to build strategic patent positions and monetize 
them through effective and focused licensing efforts”111 and to help SMEs 
who seek to license their innovation.112  
 
105 Bing Zhao, Five years after its founding, IP Bridge reflects Japan’s changing approach 
to patents, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (quoting the vice president stating that “Our licensing policy is to 
negotiate in good faith and offer a reasonable royalty. [ . . . ] some possible licensees refuse to take a 
licence. [ . . . ] In such cases, we have no choice but to ask courts to decide on whether we are right or 
not.”) https://www.iam-media.com/finance/five-years-after-its-founding-ip-bridge-reflects-japans-
changing-approach-patents (last visited Sep. 20, 2018). 
106 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited et al, 
1:15-cv-00634 (D. Del. 2015). 
107 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom Limited et al, 2:16-cv-00134 (ED. Tex. 2016). 
108 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Intel Corporation, 2:17-cv-00676 (ED. Tex 2017). 
109 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. OmniVision Technologies, Inc., 1:16-cv-00290 (D. Del. 
2016). 
110 Ambrogio Visconti, Intel Corporation v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge, THE GLOBAL 
CHRONICLE (Sep. 19, 2018) http://www.globallegalchronicle.com/intel-corporation-v-godo-kaisha-
ip-bridge/ (last visited Sep 20, 2018). 
111 FRANCE BREVETS, http://www.francebrevets.com/en (last visited Jul. 23, 2016).  
112 Convention du 2 septembre 2010 entre l'Etat, l'Agence nationale de la recherche et la 
Caisse des dépôts et consignations relative au programme d'investissements d'avenir (action «France 
Brevets»), JORF n°0205 page 16153 (Sept., 4 2010) 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/convention/2010/9/2/PRMX1022556X/jo/texte (last visited Jul. 23, 
2016). France Brevets, according to its expressed goals, aims at helping small and medium size 
companies to raise revenues from intellectual property and at providing them with the means to secure 
licenses. As such, France Brevets asserts that it champions the interests of the small and give the 
example of one company: “Laurent Tonnelier’s testimonial, CEO of mobiLead, a French start-up 
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Until July 2016, it was involved in fewer transactions. In the US, 
France Brevets was involved in twenty-one unique transactions as an 
assignee with entities from France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, German, 
Finland, Korea, and United States. These twenty-one transactions 
involved one hundred and eighty-seven patents. France Brevets registered 
one licensing agreement involving one patent. The other twenty 
transactions are assignments.113 
 
Table 6: Patent transactions with France Brevets 
Country of 
assignor/assignee 
(major contributor) 
France Brevets 
Patent Assignee 
France Brevets 
Patent Assignor 
Europe 176 95% 0 0% 
(STMicroelectronics 
Int.’l NV, 
Netherlands)114 
(95) (51%) (0) (0%) 
(Thomson Licensing, 
France) 
(40) (22%) (0) (0%) 
(CDC Propriete 
Intellectuelle, France) 
(17) (9%) (0) (0%) 
(Intuilab) (0) (0) (0) (0%) 
United States 5 3% 5 100% 
(EMS Technologies) (5) (3%) (0) (0%) 
(Clean Energy 
Management 
Solution LLC) 
(0) (0%) (5) (100%) 
South Korea 4 2% 0 0% 
LG Electronics (4) (2%) (0) (0%) 
Total 185* 100% 5** 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
* Not included: France Brevets registered that it was assigned one license 
and one partial patent assignment 
** Not included: France Brevets registered that it assigned a security 
interest in a patent 
source: USPTO 
 
France Brevets was involved in two transactions as an assignor 
with an entity from the United States and France.115 These assignments 
involved six patents: five patent assignments and one security interest. 
 
creating outstanding innovations in the Internet of Things field. Its founder, and inventor of the new 
generation of QR Code, is recognizing France Brevets for its professional technical expertise and long 
term vision.” (last visited Jul. 23, 2016). 
113 One assignment was a partial assignment (Reel Frame 32736-586). 
114 STMicroelectronics is a multinational incorporated in the Netherlands, with 
headquarters in Switzerland, and set-up and owned in part by the French and Italian government.  
115 One assignment was a security interest (Reel Frame 34662-393). 
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France Brevets sued HTC in the US through a subsidiary, NFC 
Technology, LLC.116 The use of this subsidiary creates an added layer of 
opacity—even if France Brevets attempts to disclose other valuable 
information during the suit.117 France Brevets sued HTC in Germany 
under its own name.118 France Brevets collected patents under its own 
name. Since its inception, France Brevets seems to focus on post-
commercialization licensing instead of pre-commercialization licensing. 
Contrary to Intellectual Ventures, IP Bridge and France Brevets mostly 
received patent assignments from companies or inventors from their home 
territory.119 Ninety-seven and ninety-five percent of patents assigned come 
respectively from Japan and Europe.120 IP Bridge has only assigned 
patents to Japanese companies. France Brevets have only assigned patents 
to US companies.121  
In 2018, France Brevets has collaborated with Qualcomm and IP 
Europe to help SMEs build a portfolio from filing to enforcing.122 France 
Brevets is attempting to live up to its mission statement of helping SMEs. 
France Brevets favors a licensing scheme where they receive a share of 
the royalties instead of purchasing patents to assert.123 
 
III. IS IT TIME FOR A US SPONSORED PME? 
Since their inception, government-sponsored PMEs have raised 
concerns. Their detractors present two main arguments: (1) these entities 
fail to reach their stated goals and (2) these entities present a threat to 
international trade. This section discusses these two arguments in more 
detail after discussing why the USPTO could join the market. 
 
 
116 See supra note 81. 
117 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1274–75(discussing France Brevets’ business methods). 
118 France Brevets ./. HTC (LG Düsseldorf, 4b O 140/13, March 26th, 2015). 
119 Because of European Union rules, France Brevets cannot (openly) discriminate between 
European Member States and did not seem to have. As such, this conversation uses home territory to 
describe Europe for France Brevets. 
120 In the case of France Brevets, the relevant territory seems to be Europe. France Brevets 
received a large share of patents from French entities. But it is difficult to classify companies like 
STMicroelectronics. 
121 See France Breverts, supra note 118.  
122 Joff Wild, Qualcomm, France Brevets and IP Europe join forces to create a new funding 
initiative for European SMEs, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Jun 22, 2018), https://www.iam-
media.com/finance/qualcomm-france-brevets-and-ip-europe-join-forces-create-new-funding-
initiative. 
123 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1280–81. 
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A. New Role for the USPTO 
Governmental efforts to create efficient patent markets have 
yielded ambiguous results. The US government should do more. After all, 
the Constitution specifies that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”124  
This inclusion signals that the founding fathers perceived the IP 
system as an important tool to incentivize science and the useful arts. In 
many ways, the current IP system fails to reach this goal. Under the current 
system, the US government grants exclusive rights but does not secure 
those rights for authors and inventors. Without such security, these authors 
and inventors are not incentivized to promote science and useful arts. 
The US government should consider tasking the USPTO with 
creating its own PME. First, the USPTO has a comparative advantage as 
a pre-commercial agent for patent holders. The USPTO has a monopoly 
in patent granting. During patent prosecution, patent examiners investigate 
prior-art.125 As such, the investigating examiner should be familiar with 
related applications. During prosecution, the examiner could flag potential 
matches. Similarly, the USPTO could evaluate patent value. Economies of 
scope could be created by joining granting services with valuation 
services.126 
Such a centralized agency decreases transaction costs. First, the 
USPTO would decrease searching costs between willing licensees and 
licensors because collaborators can meet in a single venue. Second, the 
USPTO could decrease negotiation costs because of their economies of 
scale and learning by doing.127 The USPTO could help even out the 
 
124 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
125 Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103. 
126 A similar argument has been made with regard to essentiality: patent offices could 
perform essentiality tests and generate economies of scope. Currently, essentiality tests are only 
performed in the case of patent pool. Standard developing organizations have benefited from 
cooperating with patent offices to assess essentiality of patents and to avoid patent ambush. See, e.g., 
Rudi Bekkers and Andrew Updegrove, A study of IPR policies and practices of a representative group 
of Standards Setting Organizations worldwide, US National Academies of Science, Board of Science, 
Technology, and Economic Policy, 66 (2012) 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf (last 
visited Jul. 23, 2016) (discussing the cooperation efforts between European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute and the European Patent Office to create a database of declared standard essential 
patents). 
127 A government-sponsored PME can provide important pricing expertise. Licensing fees 
can be complicated to set. Even post-commercialization, courts struggle to set the royalty base and 
rate. Pre-commercialization patent holders and practitioners can underestimate the value of the 
patented feature. Sophisticated contracts can, nonetheless, account for future product success. Federal 
courts have advanced different theories to set royalty base and rate. For royalty base, the two primary 
theories are “entire market value rule” and “smallest salable patent practicing unit.” If a patented aspect 
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bargaining power between small innovators and large implementers 
because they could suggest standard royalty/licensing terms and sell 
terms.128 Third, the USPTO could also leverage its mandate to suggest 
cross-technology enhancement to willing licensors. These economies of 
scope would not exist in comparable private entities like patent pools. 
The USPTO mandate could also be more limited to helping small 
innovators who lack the licensing network or focusing on pre-
commercialization. The USPTO already offers small fees for small and 
micro entities because it recognizes the budget constraint and difficulties 
these entities face.129  
Regardless, the USPTO as a PME could encourage best 
practices.130 Competition often encourage companies to cut corners (e.g., 
shame litigations). The USPTO could be isolated from market pressures 
because its patent granting services ensure that it remains self-sustainable.  
Beside pre-commercialization licensing, the USPTO could help with pre-
commercial sales. Patent holders often struggle to set appropriate prices 
 
of a product cannot be distinguished from the product and its desirability, then the court usually uses 
the entire market value rule of the final product as the royalty base. If it is distinguishable, the court 
will go down to a production product until it cannot be distinguished. This sub-product would become 
the smallest salable patent practicing unit. See, e.g., Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview 
of Reasonable Royalty Damages. 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 647 (2014); J. Gregory Sidak, The proper 
royalty base for patent damages, J. COMP. L. & ECON. (2014) doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhu030. For royalty 
rate, courts usually investigate a set of factors enumerated in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States 
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (SDNY 1970). 
128 This section does not argue that the USPTO should follow the Copyright example with 
compulsory licenses. Instead, the patent holders could opt into this system and could set the royalty 
they want as a measure of the final product value. Post-commercialization market failures affect pre-
commercialization market failures. Small innovators usually have little bargaining power as compare 
to large implementers. After all, a potential licensor could decide that it does not need a license after 
all and instead infringe and wait for suit. Since small innovators experience budget constraints, their 
hollow threat of litigation offers little bargaining power and leverage to get a (stick) license. To work 
efficiently, a patent system requires that all social beneficial innovations are incentivized regardless 
of the innovators post-patenting bargaining power. 
129 35 U.S.C. § 41(h). 
130 For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has encouraged such best practices. 
The FTC investigated MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, an alleged PAE. In re MPHJ Tech. Inv. 
LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014). After filing a suit, the FTC reached a 
settlement with MPHJ. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, Jay Mac Rust, and Farney Daniels, P.C.; 
Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 67,435, 67,436 (proposed Nov. 13, 2014). The FTC 
authority rested its case on its consumer protection mandate. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act codified as 15 U.S. Code § 45 (a). The FTC alleged that MPHJ employed deceptive 
practices. These practices include the deceptive demand letters that MPHJ sent to alleged infringers. 
In re MPHJ Tech. Inv. LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014). The FTC has found 
that demand letters have not been the main issue and that demand letter reform would not be sufficient 
to affect the nuisance suits. See FTC Study, supra note 34. at 100–01. Nonetheless, multiple 
legislations have been tabled to set the minimum that needed to be included within these demand 
letters. Id. at 31–32.  
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for their patents.131 Patent purchasers struggle to estimate patent values 
because they may not understand the technology and its applications.132 
Thus, even if licensors and licensees find each other, their valuation may 
not match. As a repeat player, the USPTO can help set a satisfying price 
for both parties during bilateral negotiation.133 Albeit not currently 
specialized in pricing, the USPTO can leverage its expertise in patent 
granting to enhance its patent valuation ability. After all, the USPTO is 
full of patent experts.134 Alternatively, the USPTO could serve as a 
centralized auction house where willing sellers and purchasers could meet. 
Willing sellers could auction their patents to ensure that knowledge is 
actually transferred. 
Second, the USPTO also has a comparative advantage in 
enforcing patents. The USPTO has more resources than most patent 
enforcers do. It would not suffer from budget constraints afflicting small 
patent holders. The USPTO has patent experts on hand. It could evaluate 
infringement claims and make recommendations at a lower cost than 
attorneys make. The USPTO can complement enforcement with public 
policy; it can change rules and adapt when it sees inefficient issues with 
enforcement and patenting approval methods.  
The USPTO has an interest in a well-functioning enforcement 
system. Its mandate should be amended to reflect this interest. Without an 
enforcement mechanism, patents and the USPTO become irrelevant. For 
example, the USPTO could use its prosecutorial discretion to discourage 
fraudulent or nuisance suits.135 
 
131 Some have argued that patent holders are likely to overvalue their patents. See e.g. Scott 
Iyama, The USPTO's proposal of a biological research tool patent pool doesn't hold water, 57 
STANFORD L. REV. 1223, 1233 (2005) (discussing the cognitive bias that lead to patent holder 
overvaluing their patent ex-ante). 
132 See, e.g., Robert Pitkethly, The valuation of patents: a review of patent valuation 
methods with consideration of option based methods and the potential for further research, The Judge 
Institute of Management Studies WP 21/97 (1997) (discussing patent valuation methods) 
http://www.cambiotec.org.mx/cyted/documentos/avaluo/doc rpit kethlyl.pdf (last visited Jul. 23, 
2016). 
133 Patent examiners investigate prior art. They are involved in re-examination proceedings. 
They gain valuable experience and expertise understanding novelty and citation system, which are 
driving elements of patent valuation. See, e.g., Allen W. Wang, Rise of the patent intermediaries, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 159, 183–190 (2010) (discussing the value of experts in assisting in the 
valuation process). 
134 Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer, & Katrin Vopel, Citations, family size, 
opposition and the value of patent rights, 32 RESEARCH POLICY 1343 (2003) (empirically estimating 
the factors affecting patent valuation). 
135 Nuisance suits are suits brought by patent holders who know that the defendant does not 
infringe but the plaintiff hopes to leverage litigation costs to reach quick settlements. See e.g., Fiona 
Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to 
Contribution?, 16 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 93 (2015). These suits decrease social 
welfare and the incentive to commercialize socially value products. Nefarious PAEs are associated 
with these activities. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013) (discussing the different PAE business model and finding that one 
type of business model PAE frequently engages in nuisance suits). If the patent system is to work, 
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Even if the USPTO could not serve as an enforcer, it could at least 
help—particularly smaller entities. For example, it could provide the 
venue for an administrative court. It has neutral experts on hand that 
already prosecuted the claim being litigated. If an administrative court 
were to use a neutral expert provided by the USPTO, it could avoid lengthy 
and onerous Markman hearings. At the least, the USPTO could create a 
small claims court and use its experts in that venue.136 
Finally, the USPTO should complement the efforts of private 
PMEs.137 The public and private entities should act as complementary 
brokers,138 and enforcers,139 to encourage a socially optimal IP system. 
 
 
litigation or the threat of litigation must also exist. Therefore, stick licenses must also exist. The 
general manager of France Brevets explains that they prefer to negotiate first and sue only if the alleged 
infringer refuses to negotiate. He argues that this distinguishes them from US patent-trolls who sue 
first and negotiate later. Schmitt, infra note 144. The HTC case in Germany was ruled on the merit. 
The patent was held valid and infringed. France Brevets, Court decision on Validity against HTC in 
Germany in the NFC patent disputes with France Brevets, Press Release (Jan. 22, 2016) 
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/ 
RELEASE_JAN%2022%202016_FRANCE_BREVETS.pdf. France Brevets succeeded 
in reaching a license through settlements using this strategy. It filed a suit against LG, and they quickly 
settled by agreeing to a license. In 2014, LG agreed a license France Brevets patents to settle the case. 
France Brevets, France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee, 
Press Release (Aug. 18, 2014). http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RE
LEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.pdf). 
136 In 2012, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office requested comments on a Patent Small 
Claims Proceedings. Department of Commerce, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Request 
for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 243, [Docket 
No. PTO–P–2012–0050] pgs. 74830-74831 (Dec. 18, 2012). See, e.g., response by Colleen Chien and 
Michael J. Guo, Does the US Patent System Need a Patent Small Claims Proceeding? (2013) (not 
supporting a small court claim) http://digitalcommons.law.scu. 
edu/facpubs/666; Robert P. Greenspoon, Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent 
Small Claims Court?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 549, 553–57 (2009) (recommending the 
establishment of a patent small claims court). 
137 The Constitution also requires that the Congress has the power to establish post offices 
and post roads. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Congress created a postal system and granted the US 
Postal Services a monopoly until an exemption was carved out. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, How Do 
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1495 (2005) (discussing the 
challenge made to the postal service monopoly). The Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 8) has not 
been read to establish a patent enforcing agency but if it were, such entity should arguably complement 
private efforts because even the government has limited resources and benefits from private actions. 
Such entities could also limit the negative externalities associated with the private efforts such as sham 
litigation and bad practices. 
138 See e.g. Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System (2010) 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297, 315–17 
(discussing the role of intermediaries in the patent system, including sales such as IP auctions). 
139 Garry A. Gabison, The Problems with the Private Enforcement of CERCLA: An 
Empirical Analysis, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 189 (2016) (finding that public agency 
often act as competitors for private suits and arguing that instead they should act complementarily). 
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B. Rent seeking behavior: focusing on post-commercial 
enforcement. 
 
Aside from the upside discussed,140 PAEs and PMEs bring their 
own problems. This section investigates the issue with receiving private 
funds, and the next section investigates the issue with receiving public 
funds. 
First, for the most part, government sponsored PMEs are not 
Sovereign Patent Funds. They are not state agencies, nor do they behave 
like a benevolent social planner who minimizes negative externalities and 
maximizes positive externalities and efficiencies. In practice, these entities 
often become a public-private partnership: they become more independent 
and do not remain accountable to the public. 
First, because of their independence, they must remain solvent 
(and potentially profitable to attract investments). This necessity can shift 
their approach to licensing from pre- to post-commercialization. France 
Brevets and IP Bridge have resorted to enforcement of infringed patents 
(stick license).141 For example, France Brevets claims to negotiate patent 
licenses with potential clients after aggregating patents;142 but France 
 
140 See e.g. "These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent market. Patent trolls 
provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets—the same benefits 
securities dealers supply capital markets." James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy (2006) 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 
190; "By creating options to generate rewards for innovators otherwise shutout of the marketplace . . 
. . Together with contingency fee lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right patents 
and the right patentees, NPEs can create important avenues for appropriating rewards for valuable 
patent rights that are owned by non-market players." David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing 
the role of non-practicing entities in the patent system, (2014) 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 434. 
141 Nuisance suits differ from stick licensing. Stick licenses are licenses obtained or sought 
under the threat of litigation. Stick licenses are common and necessary strategies to insure patent 
holders are remunerated. Stick licenses settle cases while avoiding litigation. If the patent system is to 
work, litigation or the threat of litigation must also exist. So, stick licenses must also exist. France 
Brevets general manager explains that they prefer to negotiate first and sue only if the alleged infringer 
refuses to negotiate. He argues that this distinguishes them from US patent-trolls who sue first and 
negotiate later. Schmitt, infra note 144. The HTC case in Germany was ruled on the merit. The patent 
was held valid and infringed. France Brevets, Court decision on Validity against HTC in Germany in 
the NFC patent disputes with France Brevets, Press Release (Jan. 22, 2016) 
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/RELEASE_JAN%2022%202016_FRANCE_BRE
VETS.pdf (last visited Sep 21, 2018). France Brevets succeeded in reaching a license through 
settlements using this strategy. It filed a suit against LG, and they quickly settled by agreeing to a 
license. In 2014, LG agreed a license France Brevets patents to settle the case. France Brevets, France 
Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee, Press Release (Aug. 18, 
2014). 
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RELEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.p
df (last visited Sep 21, 2018). 
142 “France Brevets” is an investment fund that intends to acquire rights over patents 
developed through public and private research, to regroup them into a pool, and to license them. 
Convention du 2 septembre 2010 (n 128) (author's translation). 
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Brevets sued large multinationals who were already practicing the 
patents.143 
To remain solvent, they may also shift their focus from small 
claims brought up by SMEs to large ticket items. These entities sue on 
behalf of the innovator and collects fees.144 For example, France Brevets 
uses a contingency-fee model.145 Contingencies have known limitations: 
it incentivizes lawyers to focus on lawsuits with high damages.146 
To remain solvent, this independence could lead to excessive 
litigation147 and nuisance suits. Nuisance suits are a heavily criticized form 
of rent seeking.148 In other words, the government can create deadweight 
loss when it sponsors instead of oversees PMEs. Nonetheless, the loss 
could be more limited than what most private PMEs may inflict. For 
example, France Brevets and IP Bridge sued large multinationals but have 
not gone after end-users, SMEs, or startups, which have been the target of 
many demand letters that epitomize undesirable rent seeking behavior.149 
 Second, private interests could exploit these PMEs. Because these 
entities receive private investments, their investors could exercise pressure 
to enforce patents against their competitors.150 For example, IP Bridge 
received funds and patents from the same entities151 (i.e. NEC, Panasonics, 
 
143 France Brevets sued LG Electronics and HTC Corporation in the U.S. and in Germany. 
See NXP Semiconductors USA Inc. v France Brevets SAS, No. C 14-1225 SI (ND Cal 2014) 
(discussing France Brevets and its litigious efforts against LG and HTC).  
144 Fabienne Schmitt, Brevets : une PME française gagne contre HTC, LES ECHOS (Mar. 
27, 2015), http://www.lesechos.fr/27/03/2015/lesechos.fr/0204261458707_brevets---une-pme-
francaise-gagne-contre-htc.htm (quoting fees a contingency between 30% and 60% of uncapped 
revenues). 
145 Contingency fee is a common arrangement in the US but a limited concept in Europe. 
Cento Veljanovski, Third Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J. L. ECON. & POLICY 405, 409 (2012) 
(discussing the limited use or ban of contingency fee in “Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; France; Greece; Ireland; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Norway; Poland”). 
146 Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social 
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES 575, n. 44 (1997). 
147 Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 211 (1994). 
148 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
149 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2. 
150 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A 
Competition Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 501 (2014) (discussing antitrust 
implication of patent assertion entities where practicing entities sell to PAEs with the aim that these 
PAEs will assert against their rivals). 
151 Einhorn, supra note 99. 
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and Hitachi).152 In 2015, IP Bridge filed a complaint against TCL 
Communications153 enforcing former Panasonic patents assigned.154 
 Distinguishing anticompetitive from financially motived 
enforcements can be difficult. Practicing entities obtain patents in their 
field. If a practicing entity assigns a patent to a government sponsored 
PME for enforcement or licensing, the PME inevitably enforces the patent 
against the assignor’s competitors. Thus, IP Bridge could have identified 
TCL as an infringer and could have wanted to monetize the patent. 
However, the reasons could be anti-competitive155 and the private 
investors may have biased a government-sponsored entity’s activities. 
Furthermore, this entity may function as a collusion device.156 
Practitioners can use PMEs or PAEs to assert patents against competitors 
to avoid counterclaims and reputational damage.157 Counterclaims are an 
important part of the patent system because they can facilitate settlements 
and cross-licensing. Without counterclaims, an alleged infringing 
practitioner would need to raise a second (as-expensive) patent suit. The 
patent assignor could leverage the cost of the second suit against the 
alleged infringer to make negotiations more difficult.158 In such a situation, 
 
152 IP Bridge, Patent Assignment by NEC Corporation to IP Bridge’s IP fund, (Dec. 2, 
2014) http://ipbridge.co.jp/news-en/141202-01e; IP Bridge, Additional Large Video Codec related 
Patent Portfolio Assignment by Panasonic Corporation to IP Bridge’s IP Fund and Entry as a 
Licensor of Patent Pool, (May 29, 2015) http://ipbridge.co.jp/news-en/additional-large-video-codec-
related-patent-portfolio-assignment-by-panasonic-corporation-to-ip-bridges-ip-fund-and-entry-as-a-
licensor-of-patent-pool. 
153 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings Limited et al, 
1:15-cv-00634 (July 24, 2015 D. Del.) 
154 Jacob Schindler, Japan’s sovereign patent fund initiates first legal action in the US, 
accusing TCL of infringing three SEPs, INTELLECTUAL ASSERT MANAGEMENT (Sept. 3, 
2015), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=c67fb03e-c954-4e9e-8a31-dd0f6c32834e. 
155 For example, TCL and Panasonic both manufacture LED/LCD television screens. 
Panasonic may have flagged the infringement itself and IP Bridge to sue TLC to impede its activities. 
David Katzmaier, Game mode on: CNET tests TVs for input lag, CNECT (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/game-mode-on-cnet-tests-tvs-for-input-lag/.  
156 Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICHIGAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TECH. L. REV. 191, 222–24 (2016) (for example, if multiple 
competitors fund and assign their patents to the same government sponsored entity, this entity could 
act as a joint-venture where they can discuss competitors and as a collusive device. In the case of IP 
Bridge, NEC, Panasonics, and Hitachi funded and transferred patents to IP Bridge. If NEC was to 
infringe a Panasonic patent, the PME may not litigate because it might be against its own interests. 
Instead, it focuses on the competitors of its funders. It cartelizes the funders who might be sued if not 
complying with the cartel’s direction. The PME would have an extensive portfolio that it could 
leverage in court against cartel members if they deviated. The PME could eliminate their 
competitors). 
157 Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE, p. 5–6 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (last visited July 29, 2016) (discussing how PAEs are 
immune to counterclaims and care little about reputational harm). 
158 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F. 3d 1286, 1333 (DC Cir 2014) (discussing 
injunctions and the eBay factors and defining a “hold out” as “an unwilling licensee of an SEP 
seeking to avoid a license based on the value that the technological advance contributed to the prior 
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a government sponsored PME would create further enforcement 
inefficiencies. 
 
C. International trade and nationalism 
Private funding may induce inefficiencies by encouraging profit 
raising instead of efficient raising behavior. However, the involvement of 
public entity or public funding raises other concerns of conflict of interest 
or nationalist behavior. This section looks at these criticisms. 
 Government sponsored PMEs have been criticized159 because they 
could target companies “to advantage domestic firms by harassing foreign 
competitors.”160 This statement highlights two potential issues. PMEs can 
discriminate twice. They can discriminate against foreign companies when 
seeking patents to enforce (or purchase in the case of PAEs) and they can 
discriminate against foreign companies when enforcing patents. 
Intellectual Discovery, IP Bridge, and France Brevets have not openly 
discriminated when acquiring and selling patents.  
 
Table 7 shows where they acquired their U.S. patents. In the U.S., 
Intellectual Discovery has registered three hundred and thirty-nine unique 
transactions with entities from South Korea, the United States, Singapore, 
Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong.161 In the U.S., IP Bridge has been 
involved in forty unique transactions involving Japan and United States 
entities. In the U.S., France Brevets has been involved in twenty-three 
unique transactions with entities from Europe, Korea, and the United 
States. 
 
Table 7: Patent assigned to government PAEs  
Country of 
assignor 
Intellectual 
Discovery 
IP Bridge  France Brevet 
 
art.”). (In the context of SEPs, when the defendants leverage litigation costs to make negotiation 
more difficult carries, this phenomenon is named a hold out).  
159 See e.g. Howard Williams, The U.S. Supreme Court Hopes To Limit Patent Trolling, 
FORBES (August 4, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/08/04/the-u-s-supreme-court-
hopes-to-limit-patent-trolling/. 
160 Michael J. Meurer and James Bessen, Congress needs to rein in patent troll BOSTON 
GLOBE (November 5, 2014) http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/04/congress-needs-rein-
patent-trolls/BSuITBqcU11mtYIr 
qSK6yO/story.html.  
161 All data is extracted from http://assignment.uspto.gov/ (last visited Jul. 31 2016). 
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Home 
country (or 
territory) 
810 68% 1184 97% 176 95% 
Other 
countries 
381 32% 42 3% 9 5% 
Total 1191 100% 1226 100% 185 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
source: USPTO 
 
All three exhibited a preference for acquiring patents from entities 
from their home territory. Non-nationalistic reasons can explain this 
observation. For example, their contact network likely extends further at 
home. The common language likely helps negotiations. The negotiation 
culture can also explain preferences to deal with these entities. 
These three entities have not exhibited a preference in their 
assignment strategies. Intellectual Discovery has assigned more patents to 
non-Korean than Korean entities.162 France Brevet has only assigned to 
non-European companies. IP Bridge has exhibited the highest preferences 
for home-nation entities as an assignor and assignee. 
 
Table 8: Patent assigned by government PAEs  
Country of 
assignor 
Intellectual 
Discovery 
IP Bridge  France Brevet 
Home 
country (or 
territory) 
26 48% 38 100% 0 0% 
Other 
countries 
28 52% 0 0% 5 100% 
Total 54 100% 1226 100% 185 100% 
As of July 31, 2016 
source: USPTO 
Government sponsored PMEs/PAEs have raised concerns over 
their licensing and enforcement strategies. So far, these entities have 
targeted non-home territory entities for enforcement. For example, France 
Brevets has sued HTC, a Chinese phone manufacturer, and LG, a Korean 
phone manufacturer. It quickly settled with LG163 whereas a German court 
 
162 See e.g. Ellis, supra note 94 (as previously stated, Intellectual Discovery assigned 
patents to Game and Technology which might be their own shell corporation). 
 
163 France Brevets, France Brevets assigne LG et HTC en contrefaçon, PRESS RELEASE 
(December 9, 2013) 
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_NFC_PR_FRENCH_DEC_9.pdf; France 
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decided the HTC case.164 France Brevets has granted licenses on the same 
technology to Sony165 and Samsung.166 In the latter cases, France Brevets 
did not file a suit.167 Despite its mandate,168 France Brevets’ deals lacked 
transparency. 
Transparency can help diminish the nationalistic fear because 
competitors could confirm non-discriminatory treatment. Non-
discriminatory treatment is part of IP Bridge’s stated goal. IP Bridge 
claims that they “litigate regardless of nationality, and offer equitable deals 
to any company as well.”169 Nonetheless, IP Bridge has sued direct 
competitors of their patent assignors. 
Transparency and disclosure of licensing terms has other positive 
externalities. Disclosure can help create best practices and inform market 
participants about expected costs, standard terms, etc. 
 Discriminatory results do not signify discriminatory intent. For 
example, a country may not have any companies in the market; hence, any 
action it brings would be against foreign companies.170 Attributing such 
intent requires a logic leap.  
Assuming that these PMEs target foreign entities, these actions 
would harm its citizen and could harm national companies. First, any 
royalty collected would increase the cost of doing business. This increase 
is partially passed on to consumers, who lose purchasing power.  
 
Brevets, France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG ELECTRONICS as its First Licensee, PRESS 
RELEASE (August 18, 2014) 
http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB_signs_LGE_RELEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.p
df. 
164 Supra note 141.  
165 France Brevet Licenses NFC Patents to Sony, PRESS RELEASE (April 4, 2016) 
http://www.francebrevets.com/ 
sites/default/files/France%20Brevet%20Licenses%20NFC%20Patents%20to%20Sony_e
ng.pdf. 
166 BRIEF-Inside Secure says France Brevets licenses NFC patents to Samsung, REUTERS 
(May 30, 2016) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFWN18R04A.  
167 Since the patents had already been challenged and held valid, Sony and Samsung 
could only opt to license the technology unless they wanted to challenge infringement. 
168 Convention du 2 septembre 2010 entre l'Etat, l'Agence nationale de la recherche et la 
Caisse des dépôts et consignations relative au programme d'investissements d'avenir (action « France 
Brevets »), Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF) n°0205 p. 16153, n.1 (Sep. 4, 2010), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/convention/2010/9/2/PRMX 
1022556X/jo/texte. 
169 Jacob Schindler, Japan’s sovereign patent fund initiates first legal action in the US, 
accusing TCL of infringing three SEPs, INTELL. ASSET MNGT (Sep. 3, 2015) http://www.iam-
media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g= 
c67fb03e-c954-4e9e-8a31-dd0f6c32834e.  
170 Note that France, Korea, and Japan all have players in most markets. So, their actions 
could be conceived as protectionist in spite of their unknown true intent. 
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Second, any action opens the door to retaliation on companies 
doing business abroad. For example, France Brevets has collected 
licensing fees from LG and Samsung, Korean phone manufacturers, and 
Sony, a Japanese equipment manufacturer. Korea and Japan have their 
own government sponsored PMEs. These Korean and Japanese PMEs may 
retaliate against French manufacturers in the much larger Asian market.171 
Even if some countries have not yet created their own PMEs, they may do 
so in the future.172  
Retaliation is a certain risk. Bilateral exposure should decrease 
nationalistic intent.173 In the dumping context, one study found that anti-
dumping allegations are less likely against a country in which relation 
exposure is higher.174 
Finally, these entities are government-sponsored or state-owned. 
The three discussed entities have acted on home and foreign soil. 
Multilateral or bilateral international trade treaties often address the 
activities of state-owned enterprises. For example, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade that has been signed by France, Japan, and Korea 
addresses “State Trading Enterprises.”175  
More recent trade agreements like the agreement between Korea 
and the United States (KORUS)176 address state enterprises more 
specifically. The treaty specifies that:  
 
Each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it 
establishes or maintains:  
(a) acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party’s 
obligations under this Agreement wherever such enterprise 
 
171 France has few phone manufacturers that operate worldwide: Alcatel-Lucent (acquired 
by Nokia in 2015), Archos, Group Bull, MobiWire, and Wiko (majority owned by Tinno Mobile, a 
Chinese group). Note that the patent enforced by France Brevets against HTC and LG had been 
assigned by a non-practitioner: so, the litigation’s aim was financial instead of strategic and it would 
be insulated from retaliation, but other French companies would not. A governmental—even 
sponsored—entity would be aware of the negative impacts on its trade relations. 
172 Jacob Schindler, Taiwan remains a bystander as patent fund activity heats up in 
China, Korea and Japan, INTELL. ASSET MNGT. (Mar. 28, 2016) http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=456d66a4-c015-45d7-b12d-cd75abe047eb (France Brevet also sued 
HTC, a Taiwanese phone manufacturer. Taiwan does not currently have such government sponsored 
PME but have considered and attempted to create one). 
173 Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska, & Matias Egeland, State-
Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, OECD TRADE POLICY Papers, No. 147, 
OECD Publishing (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en (in the past, state-owned 
enterprises have arguably acted inconsistently with international regulations and treaties). 
174 Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, Antidumping and retaliation threats, 60 J. INT'L 
ECON. 249 (2003). 
175 GATT Art. XVII (The treaty specifies that these entities must “act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement 
for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.”). 
176 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, H.R. 3080 (112th) 
(KORUS) 
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exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental 
authority that the Party has delegated to it, such as the power to 
expropriate, grant licenses, approve commercial transactions, 
or impose quotas, fees, or other charges; and  
(b) accords non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods 
or services to covered investments.177 
 
These treaties focus on non-discriminatory treatment and hold the 
signatory party responsible for the actions of its entities. KORUS specifies 
that granting licenses and imposing charges is an example of activities 
demanding equal treatment. Both activities are central to PME activities. 
Actions of government-sponsored PMEs might be construed as 
government actions. If governmental actions affect trade, these actions can 
be interpreted as violating international trade agreements and lead to 
sanctions. Within the context of KORUS, if Intellectual Discovery acted 
against US companies discriminatorily, its actions could be challenged.178 
However, these government sponsored PMEs/PAEs would not likely lead 
to international sanctions because the definition of state entity remains 
contentious.179 In recent cases,180 the World Trade Organization 
established that to be qualified as a “public body,” an entity must exhibit 
more than financial backing from a government.181 These entities must 
perform governmental functions.182 
 
177 KORUS Art. 16-3 (emphasis added). 
178 Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1, supra note 106 (this potential issue may explain why 
Intellectual Discovery has yet to enforce directly patents against private parties.). Game and 
Technology Co. Ltd v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. et al., 2:2015cv01257 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016); 
Game and Technology Co. Ltd v. Riot Games, Inc., 2:2015cv01258 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016); Game 
and Technology Co. Ltd v. Valve Corporation, 2:15-cv-01259 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016); Game and 
Technology Co. Ltd v. Wargamingnet LLP et al., 2:2015cv01260 (ED Tex. Jul. 9, 2016) (instead, it 
may have shielded from international sanctions by divesting the eight patents enforced). Reel Frame 
34847-659. 
179 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1288–94 (discussing in detail the World Trade Organization 
implications, Nguyen states that these entities could be in violation of WTO agreements). 
180 United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China - AB-
2014-8 - Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS437/AB/R); United States - Countervailing 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India - AB-2014-7 - Report of the 
Appellate Body (WT/DS436/AB/R) (in these cases, the US Department of Commerce investigated 
subsidies of foreign goods imported to the US. The US imposed countervailing duties. Those duties 
were stuck down in court because the US focused on entity ownership to classify them as 
government bodies). 
181 United States - Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China - AB-
2014-8 - Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS437/AB/R) §§ 7.72–.75. 
182 Id. at § 7.69 (the government-backed entity must carry out the “essence” of 
governmental function. This includes “the performance of governmental functions or the fact of 
being vested with, and exercising, the authority to perform such functions are core commonalities 
between government and public body.”). 
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Sanctions against a government for sponsoring a PME would fail 
because it requires trade authorities to make too many leaps.183 Even if 
patent enforcement and licensing have been compared to an innovation 
tax,184 the tax is not systematic on all imports.185 These PMEs behave more 
like private entities than government entities. Japan, Korea, France, etc. 
can point to private entities that offer the same services.186  
Even if sanctions can be avoided, the overt nationalist or 
protectionist criticisms will continue. But these criticisms would miss the 
point that the private PAEs or PMEs would fill that space without the 
safeguard that a government could provide. 
 
CONCLUSION 
These entities are neither private nor public. Since they must 
generate profit, some have behaved less like a benevolent social planner 
and more like a for-profit entity. Over 90% of the IP Bridge patents were 
assigned by large multinationals, who are capable of enforcing their own 
patents. The SMEs remain left to themselves to enforce their patents.  
These entities may nonetheless benefit some IP holders. Close to 
90% of Intellectual Discovery patents were assigned by research institutes 
and universities. These institutes may not have profited from their IP.187 
 
183 Annex 11-B § 3 (most trade agreement, like the KORUS agreement, also address 
government actions that elevate to the level of expropriation. Whether an injunction amounts to such 
expropriation requires another leap. The trade treaty specifies that an indirect government action can 
elevate to expropriation. The analysis remains case specific. The analysis requires investigating the 
objective and context of the government action. Enhancing patent enforcement would not likely 
constitute an objective valuable enough to shield from potential sanctions. See also Metalclad Corp. 
v. United Mexican States, 40 ILM 36 (ICSID 2000) (holding that a Mexican municipality and hence 
the Mexican government did not treat the plaintiff fairly when it fails to transparently deny a 
construction permit to a waste disposal facility for environment reasons after it was lead to invest 
under the belief it would be granted. However, lawfully granted injunction – particularly from 
foreign courts – would not raise to this level of expropriation). 
184 See e.g. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and barnyards: Patent trolls and the 
perils of innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810, 1837 (2007). 
185 Subsidies of exports and taxes of imports have arguably comparable effects. Only a 
few companies are pursued and “taxed.” In the cases discussed, the taxation is performed on US soil, 
a foreign jurisdiction; hence, it could be construed as a subsidy instead of a tax. The PMEs have 
mostly sued in foreign companies in US courts. 
186 Even if the innovation tax or subsidy imposed by these PMEs could be compared to 
discriminatory governmental actions, their imposition relies on patent infringement theory. It 
requires a court judgment to show that the defendants did not infringe. One who seeks equity must 
do equity. In this case, it is not clear that equity has be performed by all parties. 
187 See e.g., Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and A. Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls? 
The role of nonpracticing patent owners in the innovation economy, 21 INDUSTRIAL AND 
CORPORATE CHANGE 73 (2011) (arguing that non-practicing entities can have an upside); Mark A. 
Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is Patent Enforcement Efficient, 98 BU L. REV. 649 (2018) (discussing 
the inefficiencies associated with non-practicing patent entities while acknowledging their 
theoretical upsides. This tool in the hand of a benevolent social planner could set an example for the 
rest of the industry. This standard setting resonates in other facets of government (e.g., employment 
conditions, salary, etc.). PAEs/PMEs like every tool have upsides and downsides). 
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To harness the upside and decrease the downside, governments can create 
not-for-profit public-private partnerships. Such a not-for-profit entity 
could serve the IP system and the right holders better. 
Since they receive public backing, their actions receive more 
scrutiny. Discriminatory results may not correlate with discriminatory 
intent. Transparency remains the government’s most potent ally and these 
entities should set the tone for the rest of the industry. 
If the governments are willing to enter this market where 
reputational damages are abundant and risks are plenty, it signals that they 
believe they have a lot to earn. Whether it is addressing inefficiencies of 
the IP system or simply raising profits for right holders, these entities are 
propagating. For example, in 2014 in China, Ruichuan IPR Funds was 
launched as a public-private partnership.188 
The action of these government sponsored PMEs should be 
addressed in perspective. They account for a small portion of patents and 
suits in the United States. The three PMEs together hold about 2,500 U.S. 
patents. Since their inception in 2010, the USPTO has granted over 1.5 
million patents.189 These PMEs brought a handful of suits in the U.S. in 
2015. In comparison, in the 2014 fiscal year, 5,550 patent suits were filed 
in Federal District Courts.190 These entities remain a new phenomenon. 
They are still perfecting their business model, but they should be 
encouraged to adopt best practices before it is too late. 
 
188 Williams, supra note 159; Meurer & Bessen, supra note 160; Peter Roff, The 
frightening emergence of government patent trolls, WASHINGTON TIMES (Aug. 31, 2014) 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2014/aug/31/roff-the-frightening-emergence-of-government-paten/. 
189 U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm. 
190 U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States 
Courts, ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE US COURTS, Table C-2 (Sept. 2015). 
